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Pursuant to Rule 76(e), appellant moves this court to
reconsider its decision in this matter.

In support of this motion,

appellant relies on the following points and authorities.
POINT ONE
RECONSIDERATION IS MANDATORY
BECAUSE THE COURT HAS NOT YET
RULED ON CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES
Appellant (hereafter Call) presented a subdivision plat
to respondent (hereafter West Jordan) for approval.

Pursuant to

a local ordinance, West Jordan required Call to pay $16,576.00 in
order to proceed with the subdivision.
suit to challenge that payment.

Thereafter, Call filed

In part Call alleged, inter

alia, that:
17.
The defendant has required the named
plaintiffs, in accordance with Ordinance No. 33
of West Jordan, to pay the sum of Sixteen Thousand
Dollars ($16,000.00) to the City of West Jordan
for the public purpose of flood control and/or
parks and recreation.
18.
Plaintiffs have received no compensation
for such payment, and the above taking was made
without the commencement of any action for eminent
domain by the City of West Jordan.
19. Other Plaintiffs within the class have
been required to dedicate land or pay money to
the City of West Jordan under Ordinance No. 33.
No compensation has been received by such plaintiffs
for the land dedicated or payments made and no
actions for eminent domain have been instituted
by the City of West Jordan.
20.
The actions of the defendant in requiring
the dedication of land or payment of money as a
condition for app~oval of a subdivision constitute
the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation, in violation of the Utah Const.
art. I, § 22, and the U.S. Const. amend. v.
See also paragraphs 23 through 27 of the Complaint for
:onstitutional challenges on other grounds.
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The constitutional issues were duly briefed
to the court.

and Prese·
(See Brief of Appellant p. 10-30, and Reply Brie

of Appellant p. 21-25.)
Two members of this court have written that the City
ordinance is not unconstitutional.
(See .'1aj ori ty Opinion at
p.

5 of Green Slip Opinion.) Two other members of the court hav,

written that the city ordinance is unconstitutional.

1

(See

Dissenting Opinion at p. l 7 and 18 of Green Slip Opinion.)
If we read the opinion correctly,
two tie on the constitutional issues.

that makes a two· ,

It appears that

justice (and the swing vote) is still neutral on the

t~e

fi:::

constitut;~

issue.
STEN ART, Justice:

(Concurring)

However, the ordinance in question clearly
approaches constitutionally protected rights,
i.e., the prohibition against the taking of
private property without the compensation.
The power of a city, or for that matter of
the state, to require subdividers to dedicate
a portion of their land for public improvements is not without limitation.
In my judgment, the Court should address the problem
of what standards delineate a constitutional
and unconstitutional force of dedication by
a subdivider.
The question is certainly one
that will recur and ought to be resolved by
the Court.
Green Slip Opinion at p.7.
Thus, the critical constitutional issue remains unced
by this court's opinion.
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POINT TWO
THE ISSUES ALREADY DECIDED BY
THE COURT WILL BE MOOT IF THE
WEST JORDAN ORDINANCE IS FOUND
TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A crucial issue in this case was whether West Jordan
had power to enact local ordinance 9-C-8(a).

In a three-two decision,

this court has ruled that the ordinance was authorized under the
general grant of "police power."

(§

10-8-84 U.C.A.)

However, that ruling is moot if the ordinance itself is
unconstitutional.

Or, in other words, the State of Utah did not

(and indeed cannot) delegate power to the City of West Jordan to
pass an unconstitutional ordinance.

As the court stated in Pioneer

Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, et al., 176
N.E.2d 800

(Ill.

1961).

Is it reasonable that a subdivider should be
required under the guise of a police power
regulation to dedicate a portion of his
property to public use; or does this amount
to a veiled exercise of the power of eminent
domain and a confiscation of private property
behind the defense of police regulations?
Of similar import see Colis v. City of Bloomington,
2 46 N. w. 2 d 19 , 2 6 (Minn . 19 7 6 ) .
While in general subdivision regulations
are a valid exercise of the police power, made
necessary by the problems subdivisions create-i. e., greater needs for municipal services and
facilities--, the possibility of arbitrariness
and unfairness in their application is nonetheless substantial: A municipality could use dedication regulations to exact land or fees from a
subdivider far out of proportion to the needs
created by his subdivision in order to avoid
imposing the burden of paying for additional
services on all citizens via taxation. To
tolerate this situation would be to allow
an otherwise acceptable exercise of police power
to become grand theft.
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See also Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v · Town of
Plainfield,

379 A.2d 200, 203

(N.H. 1977).

As an exercise of ~he state's police power,
however, such condition [subdivider's
dedication of property] must not only be
reasonably necessary to protect the public
safety but also otherwise constitutional.
POINT THREE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEST IS
SATISFIED ONLY IF THERE IS A
"RATIONAL NEXUS" BETWEEN THE
NEEDS CREATED BY THE SUBDIVISION
AND THE SEVEN PER CENT FEE
We begin the analysis by noting that "flood control,
parks and recreation" are a bit like motherhood--everyone is in
favor.

Indeed, no one can gainsay the majority's view that:
Just how essential and desirable it is
that cities have such authority in planning
their growth is brought into sharp focus by
reflecting, on the one hand, upon the conditions
in the slum and ghetto areas of various cities,
where there are none, or inadequate, parks and
playgrounds and, on the other, upon the enrichment of life which has been conferred on other
cities where there are parks, plazas, recreational
and cultural areas (some of which are very famous)
for the use of the public. (Green Slip Opinion at p. 4.)
It should be clear enough that appellant is not again:

"flood control, parks and recreation. "
finance such laudable goals.

The issue is how to fair:

As Mr. Justice Holmes has stated:

The protection of private property in the
Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is
wanted for public use, but provides that it
shall not be taken for such use without
compensation.
A similar assumption is made
in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment.
[Citation omitted.]
When this
seemingly absolute protection is found to
be qualified by the police power, the
.
natural tendency of human nature is to extena
the qualification more and more until at
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last private property disappears. But that
cannot be accomplished under the constitution
of the United States . . . . A strong desire
to improve the public condition is not enough
to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for
the change.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 43 s.ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322.
Thus, competing

interests clash.

On one hand, there

is a public interest in improving the community.

On the other

hand, there is a personal interest in the control and ownership
of private property. The courts have devised a constitutional test
which balances those competing interests:
If the need is generated by the subdivider's
own activities, i.e., by the subdivision of land
for the purpose of its development by dwellings
to be sold, transferred, rented to, and occupied
by persons who will directly benefit from the
installation of improvements, then the constitutionally required relation to the public
health, safety, morales and general welfare
has been established.
Rathkopf, 3 The Law of Zoning and Planning,
Chap. 71 at p. 55 (3d Ed. 1972).
The vast majority of all cases have, with some minor
variations, adopted the Rathkopf test.
Accordingly, we conclude that where
offsite improvements can properly be required of a subdivider, the subdivider can
be compelled "only to bear that portion of
the cost which bears a rational nexus to
the needs created by, and [special] benefits
conferred upon, the subdivision.
Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town
of Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200, 204
(N. Hamp. 1977).
If the requirement is within the statutory
grant of power to the municipality and if
the burden cast upon the subdivider is
specifically and uniquely attributable to
his activity, then the requirement is
permissible; if not, it is forbidden and
amounts to a confiscation of private
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property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable
regulation under the police power.
Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village
of Mount Prospect et al., 176 N.E.2d
800 (Ill. 1961).
But the plain rationale of these cases is that
a subdivider may be compelled only to
assume a cost which bears a rational nexus to
the needs created by, and benefits conferred
upon, the subdivision . . .
Beyond that,
Planning Board impositions, although purportedly
authorized by the Planning Act or the local
ordinance, amount to impermissible exactions.
Brazer v. Borough of Mountainside,
262 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1970).
We have heretofore held in this opinion
that the involuntary dedication of land is a
valid exercise of the police power only to the
extent that the need for the land required to
be donated results from the specific and unique
activity attributable to the developer. The
validity of a requirement of a voluntary
donation being so limited, we think a regulation
requiring a donation of "at least 7%" is clearly
arbitrary on its face.
Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston,
264 A.2d 910 (Rhode Is. 1970).
The test which has been generally applied
in determining whether a requirement that a
developer set aside land for parks and playgrounds as a prerequisite to the approval of
a subdivision plan is whether the burden cast
upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely
attributable to his own activity.
Where the
requirement is uniquely attributable co the
subdivider's activitv, it has been held to be
a perrnissable exercise of the police power.
Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Plan~inq
Commission, 273 A. 2d 880 (Conn. 1910) ·
See also:
Haugen v. Gleason, 359 P.2d 108 (Ore. 1960);
Sanchez v. City of Santa Fe, 481 P.2d 401
(N. Mex. 1971);
State ex rel. Noland v. St. Louis County,
478 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1972);
Admiral Development v. City of Maitland,
267 So.2d 860 (Fla. App. 1972):
·city of ~eguon v. Lake Estates Co.,
190 N.W.2d 912 (Wis. 1971) ·
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Cf.:

Cimrnaron Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners,
563 P. 2d 945 (Colo. 1977);
City of ~1ontgoIT\ery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So.2d
3 6 3 (Ala. 19 7 8) ;
Krughoff
v. Naperville, 369 N.E.2d a92 (Ill. 1977);
Collis v. Bloomington, 246 N. W. 2d 19 (Minn. 1976);
Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County,
394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964).
POINT FOUR
THE SHORTCOMING OF THE MAJORITY
OPINION CAN BE DEMONSTRATED BY
A SINGLE EXAMPLE
The majority opionion pays lio service to the doctrine
discussed in Point Three.
We agree that the dedication should have
some reasonable relationship to the needs created
by the subdivision.
Green Sheet Opinion at p. 4.
However, the majority gives with the right hand, but takes away
with the left hand.

A single example will demonstrate the short-

coming of the majority view.
A.

The Example.

Suppose that the old-time citizens (old-timers) of town
are clamoring for a new playground.

For the most part, the old-

timers live on the south side of town, and they want the new playground located in their south-side neightborhood.

It is estimated

that the cost of the new playground will be $10,000.

However,

the old-timers do not want their taxes increased.
At that same time, Mr. Subdivider walks in the door to
get his new subdivision approved for the north side of town.
The mayor (wishing to get re-elected) sees an opportunity to get

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-7Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

the needed $10,000.

The town approves the new subdivis·
ion on ::
condition that the subdivider will pay a $10,000 fee.
The subdivider (having no real choice) pays the Slo,
to get his subdivision approved for the north side of tow

n. Th:

town collects the $10,000 and thereby finances a new nlayg
"
round
for the old-timers on the south side of town.

Of course, north·:

children are free to use the south-side playground.

But, it is

away, and few of them do so.
In this example, the old-time residents found a de•i::
by which new residents would finance improvements (in this case
a playground) which was for the primary benefit of the old-tim!:.
Although they paid the bill, the new residents got little or ns
value from the playground on the other side of town.
B.

Application of the Example to the Facts of this
Case.

The majority opinion presumes that there is some
difference between the example above and the facts of this case
The opinion presumes that West Jordan needs some new parks,
playgrounds or flood control.

The opinion presumes that the

normal sources of revenue are insufficient to finance the imprC'
men ts.

The opinion presumes that the town has some plan in mh

(or on paper) to provide the improvements.

The opinion presume:

that the improvements will benefit every part of town (not ius:
the old-timers).

The opinion presumes that a fee of 7% (tim~:

total number of new subdivisions) will equal the cost of the
improvements.
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The trouble is that the foregoing is all guesswork.
There is absolutely no factual development to confirm how, when
or where the money will be used.

For all we really know, the

entire $16,576 from appellants will be used to build a playground for the old-timers

ten miles from the new subdivision.

In anticipation of this problem, the majority tells us:
. . . that it will be used for its
stated purpose is assured, first, by
the integrity and good faith of the
public officials charged with that
responsibility; and second, by the
fact that the recognized principle
is that if money is collected from the
public for a specific purpose, it becomes a trust fund committed to the
carrying out of that purpose.
However, those truisms won't work.

There is not one

word in the ordinance which would prohibit West Jordan from
using the entire $16,576 to build a new playground ten miles from
the new subdivision.
in full good faith,

Or, stated in other words, West Jordan can
and without breaching any trust, spend the

$16,576 anywhere in town.

The constitutional safeguard lies in the

words of the ordinance--not the good faith of the officials!
In this regard, it is instructive to compare the
language of the West Jordan ordinance with the Walnut Creek!/
ordinance.
City of West Jordan
Section 9-C-B(a).
In addition to all
other requirements prescribed under this
ordinance the subdivider shall be required
to dedicate seven per cent (7.0%) of the
land of the proposed subdivision to the

l/The majority opinion relies heavily upon the case of Associated
Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc., v. Walnut Creek, 94 Cal.
RiJfr. 6 3 8Sponsored
, 4 8 4by thep S.J.
. 2Quinney
d 6 0Law
6 Library.
(19Funding
71 ) .for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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public use for the benefit of the
citizens of West Jordan . . . or in
the alternative at the option of the
governing body of the City, the City
may accept the equivalent value of the
land in cash if it deems advisable.
Section 9-C-8(b).
The monies received
by the City as a result of [this ordinance]
. . . shall be used by the City for its
flood control and/or parks and recreation
facilities.
Walnut Creek
(c)
The land, fees, or combination
thereof are to be used only for the purpose
of providing park or recreational facilities
to serve the subdivision.
(e)
The amount and location of land
to be dedicated or the fees to be paid shall
bear a reasonable relationship to the use of
the park and recreational facilities by the
future inhabitants of the subdivision.
Walnut Creek,
Based on specific language of the statute, tl'le cour:
in Walnut Creek said:
;mether or !'lot such a direct connection
is required by constitutional considerations,
Section 11546 provides the nexus which concerns
[the developer] Associated.
The act requires
that the land dedicated or the fees paid are
to be used only for the purpose of providing
park or recreational facilities . . . [and]
that the amount and location of land or fees
shall bear a reasonable relationship to the
use of the facilities by the future inhabitants
of the subdivision.
Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d at 612.
It seems obvious that the Walnut Creek case is no
precedent for this case.
The West Jordan ordinance is so broad and general as
to be almost meaningless.

It is no answer to contend that the

money was illegally taken but wisely spent (Robin Hood).
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This

case does not attack the manner of spending.

This case attacks

the ordinance under which the money was taken.
POINT FIVE
NO RECORDED CASE SUPPORTS THE
CONCLUSION REACHED BY THE MAJORITY
The "majority" opinion cites a number of cases in
support of its conclusion.

However, no recorded case has

stretched the Constitution as far as this case.
There are perhaps two or three dozen cases to be
considered in analyzing this matter.

Yet each case construes

the language of a different statute or ordinance.

In each case,

the form of taking (or dedication of property) is different.

In

each case, the land or money was used in a different fashion.
Thus, the concept of precedent is particularly elusive in this
case.
For example, the majority relies primarily on the case
of Associated Home Builders, Inc., v. City of Walnut Creek, 484
P.2d 606

(Cal. 1971).

As we have pointed out in Point Four above,

that case relies upon an ordinance substantially different from
the ordinance before this court.

Likewise, the majority relies

on the case of Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949).
In that case, the developer challenged a requirement concerning the
width of certain streets within the subdivision.
presents a much different problem than this case.

Factually, that
Here, the city

ordinance exacts a cash fee which goes into the general fund of
the city.

In like fashion, other cases cited by the majority are

each distinguishable on their peculiar facts.
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In our research, we have found no reported
has approved an ordinance as broad and indiscriminate

case •hi,:
as the

':i::

Jordan ordinance now before this court.
In surveying the various cases, it appears that t~
closest case factually is the case of Admiral Development Cor:
::..:.:.t'

v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860

(Fla. App. 1972).

That cas:

reviewed a city ordinance virtually identical to the West Jordt
ordinance.

The Maitland ordinance reads:
(a) When lands are subdivided within
the city, at least five per cent (5%) of
the gross area of such lands shall be
dedicated by the owner to the city for
park and recreation purposes.
The location of such park and recreation area
shall be recommended by the planning and
Zoning commission, to the city council
for its approval.
(b)
If, in the judgment of the city
council, the land to be subdivided is too
small for a park or recreation area to be
dedicated from such land, then the owner shall pay to the city a sum of money,
equal to five per cent (5%) of the value
of the gross area, which shall be held in
escrow and used by the city for the purpose of acquiring parks and recreation
areas and for no other purpose.
In that case the court had little trouble in findinc

that,

".

. the language of said section is so overbroad as t:

render the section invalid."
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CONCLUSION
The court should re-hear the case to consider the
constitutional issues.

The court should rule the West Jordan

ordinance unconstitutional.

-

+"\..-

DATED this ~~ day of January, 1980.

Robert J. DeBry
Attorney for Plainti fs-Appellants
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 278-4439
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Substitute
Petition for Rehearing and Memorandum in Support of Rehearing was
served upon Nick J. Colessides, attorney for respondent, 610 East
South Temple, Suite 202, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102, by U.S.
mail, postage prepaid, this;)~

+-L

day of January, 1980.
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